The whole extraordinary affair took a new and even more sensational turn on the afternoon of 16 March 1914, when Madame Henriette Caillaux walked into the office of Gaston Calmette, drew a revolver from her muff and shot him dead. During a week as caretaker Interior Minister in December 1913 he had raided the Sûreté archives (a raid condemned by its director, Pujalet, as a “burglary”) and removed copies of the Italian intercepts which had embarrassed Poincaré the previous spring-no doubt as a potential means of putting pressure on the President. . . . Had already taken devious precautions of his own in case the decrypts were published. Caillaux had reason to think that Calmette had obtained decrypted cables from another journalist, who was given them by a former foreign minister, and, in January, he warned the President, Raymond Poincaré, that Le Figaro was planning to publish the decrypts. As Andrew explains, the climax of the affair occurred when Gaston Calmette, the editor of Le Figaro, accused the former Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux of having worked in the German interest. In 1914, on the brink of war, French officials became so consumed with an earlier episode in which their cabinet noir had decrypted certain German messages-with politicians trying to wield the decrypts to embarrass one another or protect themselves from embarrassment-that they helped keep the intelligence professionals from going on with their actual work of anticipating a German attack. More frequently, one comes upon absurd stories like the following.
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When a delegation of apparatchiks came to see him, he took it for granted that they were coming to depose him, since that’s what he would have done in their place, and was startled when they begged him to step forward and lead, being themselves dependent on the cult of the great leader.
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The invasion was launched, and Stalin soon retreated to his dacha in shock.
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The delayed reaction cost hundreds of thousands of lives, perhaps millions, and very nearly handed Hitler victory. Stalin not only ignored information about the coming invasion but threatened anyone who took it seriously, since he knew that his ally Hitler wouldn’t betray him. Richard Sorge, a Russian spy in Germany’s Embassy in Japan, gained detailed knowledge about the approaching German invasion of Russia in 1941, and passed it on. It’s remarkably hard to find cases where a single stolen piece of information changed the course of a key battle.ĭuring the First World War, the British decrypting center known as Room 40 had useful information about the movement of German ships during the Battle of Jutland, off the coast of Denmark, but the officers of the British fleet, disliking the cut of the analyst’s intellectual jib, contemptuously ignored what they were told, and managed only to draw a battle they could have won. Hard-won information is ignored or wildly misinterpreted. Again and again, a reader of Andrew’s history finds that the countries with the keenest spies, the most thorough decryptions of enemy code, and the best flow of intelligence about their opponents have the most confounding fates. (That early spy mission, in which most of the Israelites came back to say that the promised land was too well guarded to keep its promise, went badly enough, God knew.) There seems to be a paranoid paradox of espionage: the better your intelligence, the dumber your conduct the more you know, the less you anticipate.
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Yet these tales of spying and counterspying involve dances so entangled and contradictory that one finishes this history wondering if having a successful spy service really is a good way to have a successful nation. For anyone with a taste for wide-ranging and shrewdly gossipy history-or, for that matter, for anyone with a taste for spy stories-Andrew’s is one of the most entertaining books of the past few years. Andrew, who is a longtime history don at Cambridge, begins his book-as long and thorough as Diarmaid MacCulloch’s classic “ A History of Christianity,” though less violent-with one of the most appealing opening lines in recent nonfiction: “The first major figure in world literature to emphasize the importance of good intelligence was God.” The Israelites’ reconnaissance mission to the promised land of Canaan is the first stop in Andrew’s tour of four thousand years of spying the last is the American failure to anticipate 9/11. Is intelligence intelligent? This is the question that runs or, rather, leaps through the mind of the reader struggling with Christopher Andrew’s encyclopedic work “ The Secret World: A History of Intelligence” (Yale). This content can also be viewed on the site it originates from.